By Sonny Iroche
As the world braces for dozens of elections in the next few years, experts warn of “a storm of disinformation” driven by AI-enhanced tools . Even in Slovakia recently, a deepfake audio clip purporting to expose electoral fraud was quickly debunked – yet as the World Economic Forum notes, “the damage had already been done” . AI‑generated content (videos, voices, text) can spread across borders almost instantly, exploiting the lag in fact‑checking. With over 50 countries holding elections between 2025 and 2026, including major democracies and Nigeria’s 2027 polls, the scale of this threat is unprecedented. In this context, collaboration across governments, tech platforms and civil society is urgent. As one World Economic Forum (WEF) analysis emphasizes, we face an “expanding cyber-attack surface” and must urgently upgrade our tools to protect democracy.
Nigeria’s Digital Vulnerabilities
Nigeria, South Africa and other democracies in Africa are not immune. Going by the 2023 elections, Nigeria’s electoral bodies and political landscape are already under cyber‑threat and disinformation fire. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) itself has reported repeated hacking attempts against its systems. In 2022 the commission disclosed that its results portal (IReV) came under attack from “hackers across the world,” with probes traced as far as Asia . The Nigerian government revealed that nearly 13 million cyber‑attacks were recorded during the 2023 election cycle – peaking at almost 7 million on election day alone . These attacks included everything from distributed-denial-of-service and phishing to brute-force login attempts on official websites and databases . In short, Nigeria’s nascent online voting infrastructure has already been probed relentlessly (and repelled) by hostile actors
Domestic analysts warn the worst is yet to come. The Cyber Security Experts Association of Nigeria (CSEAN) forecast that “INEC’s cyberinfrastructure will be targeted in the lead-up, during, and after the elections,” from website defacements to direct hacking of its BVAS voter accreditation devices . They also predicted a “significant amount of misinformation and disinformation” on social media, possibly propagated by foreign agents hired to influence perceptions . These warnings are rooted in reality: in 2015 Nigeria’s last peaceful handover, foreign data firms (Team Jorge and Cambridge Analytica) were documented running disinformation campaigns targeting President Buhari . And even in 2023, deepfaked audio clips circulated on WhatsApp and Twitter – for example, fabricated recordings claimed to feature top candidates conspiring to rig the vote – later denounced by their subjects as outright fakes . This “weaponization of manipulated information,” as CSEAN put it, seriously undermines trust in our democratic institutions .
Compounding these cyberthreats is Nigeria’s own social-media landscape. With 122.5 million internet users (55.4% of the population) and over 31 million active social-media accounts , political discourse increasingly moves online. Nigeria “meets all the criteria of vulnerability to social media abuse” identified by international experts – deep ethnic and regional divides, low trust in institutions, and highly partisan media . As a recent national workshop concluded, “social media have become a real problem for our elections” . Disinformation is already “driving dissent and threatening national cohesion,” warned one democracy NGO . Indeed, most Nigerians now look to social feeds for election news, making the information space a high-stakes battleground . In this context of literacy gaps, linguistic diversity (250+ languages), and urban‑rural divides, the risk is that sophisticated digital attacks could outpace our ability to respond.
Generative AI: A New Weapon in the Arsenal
The threat is multiplying. Recent advances in generative AI – deepfakes and large-language models – supercharge disinformation. In practical terms, this means automated fakes at scale. Already, sophisticated “deepfake” videos and images are appearing worldwide. For example, AP News reports that “AI-generated deepfakes have been undermining elections around the globe” – from Bangladesh to Slovakia – and that a “wave of AI deepfakes tied to elections in Europe and Asia has coursed through social media” . Nigerian observers fear a similar onslaught. Analysts note that modern AI video tools can take a text script and fabricate realistic video of any person speaking it . One expert describes how in the 2027 context “cyber thugs” could draft an inflammatory speech and have it delivered in a deepfake video by an impersonated authority figure (e.g. the INEC chair) , thereby sparking chaos or distrust. Likewise, audio‑cloning technology can mimic voices: in the U.S. primaries of 2024, an AI-cloned Joe Biden urged New Hampshire voters not to show up for the ballot . Such tactics – now at one’s fingertips – could easily be deployed here (e.g. a fake broadcast of a known politician urging chaos or boycott).
Text-based AI brings another vector. Large language models (LLMs) like GPT can impersonate anyone in writing. Researchers have already created a chatbot impersonating a U.S. presidential candidate to solicit votes in a primary, violating platform rules . In Nigeria’s 2027 race, adversaries could similarly deploy AI chatbots or phony social-media accounts masquerading as party candidates or community leaders, spreading “incendiary information” (false withdrawals, endorsements, conspiracies) on a broad scale . Meanwhile, AI-driven microtargeting refines Cambridge Analytica’s playbook: with millions of online profiles, machine learning can sift data to identify susceptible voter groups and tailor persuasive content to them. In fact, analysts warn AI now creates “autonomous attack systems” that can relentlessly probe and assault networks without human intervention . These bots can launch hundreds of thousands of simultaneous intrusion attempts on voting servers or result portals, overwhelming defenses and defying attribution . In short, an anonymous AI “hive” could stage complex cyber campaigns – hacking, spam, false leaks – far beyond the capacity of yesterday’s lone hackers.
Lessons from Abroad: Weaponizing Cyber Warfare
Nigeria’s concerns echo what happened elsewhere. In the 2016 U.S. election, official inquiries found Russian intelligence operatives penetrated multiple state election systems and stole private data. Investigators report that Russia “launched cyberattacks” on voting software in at least 21 states, and even accessed the emails of over 100 election officials . The stolen DNC emails were then selectively leaked to undermine a candidate. Simultaneously, political firms (like Cambridge Analytica) harvested social data on tens of millions of Americans to micro-target campaign ads with psychological profiling. U.S. policymakers described this mix of data engineering and hacking as “information warfare” – a poorly regulated “Wild West” of online influence . Indeed, one U.S. senator warned that, without checks, foreign actors could buy divisive political ads or use illicit data to covertly steer elections .
Similar tactics have since appeared globally. In the UK’s 2016 Brexit referendum and 2017 election, covert ad campaigns and Russian-backed troll farms were documented online. In the EU’s 2019 vote, digitally altered images and social bots emerged, often traced to foreign networks. In Asia and Africa, governments report foreign interference too: for instance, AI-generated campaign videos recently targeted Bangladesh and Moldova’s leaders . (The Moldovan example is illustrative: President Maia Sandu was “a frequent target of online disinformation created with AI” .) In Nigeria’s own backyard, Kenya and Uganda have seen viral AI clips. The bottom line: No country is safe from these tactics. Attackers can experiment abroad and quickly adapt successes to Nigeria’s context – exploiting social divisions and technical gaps.
The Stakes for Nigeria’s Democracy
All these trends converge on Nigeria’s 2027 ballot. Our past elections show a fractious environment: disinformation campaigns, even ones later debunked, depressed turnout. One post-mortem found that only 27% of registered voters showed up in 2023 – the lowest ever – as people became “inundated with allegations of the real being fake and fakes being real” . The erosion of trust was so severe that fact-finding efforts lost impact: groundbreaking investigative reports were ignored because audiences assumed they might also be “fake” . This “liar’s dividend” (where accusing truth of being false makes everything suspect) played out in viral audio conspiracies in 2023, from phantom PDP plots to bogus Labour Party recordings . In other words, seeing is no longer believing.
In 2027, these dangers are compounded: generative AI makes deception cheap, fast and hard to trace. Imagine mass-market deepfakes of politicians begging for votes, or subversive spectrograms mimicking coalition leaders. Imagine cellphones buzzing with perfectly tailored propaganda aimed at tribal loyalties or religious fears. In a country as large and diverse as Nigeria, the divisive power of such manipulation could be devastating. The integrity of our election is not an academic concern – it’s existential. As one democracy expert warns, “we have fixed the integrity of the process, but we cannot fix the lack of integrity of some people” . In other words, advanced tech may secure the ballot count, but public perception and posturing are on a different battlefield.
Recommendations: Strengthening Nigeria’s Defenses
To safeguard 2027 and beyond, Nigeria’s election stakeholders must act now with a multi-pronged strategy. Drawing on best practices and expert advice, the following measures can build resilience:
• Harden Electoral Cyber Infrastructure: INEC should treat its digital platforms (IReV results portal, BVAS networks, registration databases) as critical national infrastructure. This means deploying 24/7 intrusion monitoring, automated DDoS protection, and routine stress-testing with ‘red-team’ ethical hackers. Election servers should be isolated on secure networks with backup servers geographically dispersed. Sensitive operations (like result transmission) must use strong end-to-end encryption and multi-factor authentication. The government’s cybersecurity agencies (NCC, NITDA, NCSC) should continuously audit INEC’s systems. As Nigeria’s own experience shows , proactive cyber defense is vital – the alternative is catastrophic data compromise. INEC has promised enhanced monitoring of networks post-2023 ; now it must fully operationalize those commitments.
• Regulate Digital Political Ads and Campaigns: Nigeria should adopt clear rules for online campaign content. This can include mandatory disclosures on political ads (names of sponsors, spending), similar to proposed “Honest Ads” laws elsewhere . Social-media platforms must identify and label politically relevant content. A Digital Code of Conduct should be negotiated (or legislated) for parties and candidates, committing them to refrain from using cyber and AI tricks. Civil society leaders propose updating the existing party pledge (first used in 2015/2019) to explicitly ban social-media disinformation . One creative approach is a pre-election “digital pledge” – as tested in Kenya – where parties publicly commit to truthfulness online . Even if not legally enforceable, the “moral suasion” of such a pledge can deter overt abuses. In parallel, Nigeria must fast-track the enactment of strong cybercrime and data-protection laws. The long-delayed National Cybersecurity Policy and Strategy (or a new Watchdog Agency bill) should criminalize automated attacks on election systems and mandate penalties for foreign-funded disinformation campaigns. Global best practices (EU Digital Services Act, African Union cybersecurity conventions) can guide new regulations.
• Boost Public Digital Literacy: The public is the first line of defense. Launch a nationwide media-literacy campaign now, well before 2027. Educate voters (particularly youth) on spotting fake media: e.g. reverse-image-search, verifying sources, or recognizing AI artifacts. Use radio, schools, community centers and influencers to teach citizens to “think before you click.” Experts emphasize that in a country “as big and diverse as Nigeria, the key is civic education and media literacy” . This could include integrating disinformation awareness into school curricula and NECO civics materials. NGOs, religious leaders, and journalists should run workshops on digital hygiene. The government could partner with telecoms to send periodic SMS tips about online misinformation or deploy free fact-check chatbots on WhatsApp. Over time, a well-informed electorate will be less easily swayed by even sophisticated AI lies.
• Support Fact-Checkers and Rapid Response: Civil society should be empowered to act as an early-warning system. Nigeria already has experienced fact-checking groups (e.g. Dubawa, PesaCheck, African Check). These outfits must be given resources – funding, training, and AI tools – to monitor social media during campaigns. New platforms exist: open-source AI detectors can flag tampered images and synthetic audio . INEC and media coalitions should establish a Rapid Response Unit that works with fact-checkers to debunk viral falsehoods in real-time. For example, Dubawa’s creative use of AI-aided verification was praised as a way to “match the speed of misinformation” . Mainstream news and influencers should amplify verified corrections quickly. Social media companies must honour government and NGO requests to remove proven deepfakes or coordinate notices on suspicious content (building on the limited measures they deployed in 2023 ). While fact-checking can’t catch everything (as one analyst wryly notes, “fact‑checking is no silver bullet” ), a strong network of trusted fact-checkers and media partners will raise the cost for anyone trying to flood the information space with lies.
• Build AI Monitoring and Research Capacity: Nigeria should invest in its own AI monitoring infrastructure. This might include an independent Election Cybersecurity Lab under NITDA or an INEC-adjacent body, staffed by technologists, data scientists and linguists. Its role would be to use AI to scan media feeds (social and traditional) for emerging deepfakes and misinfo trends. Similar units are being discussed globally; as the WEF urges, Nigeria must be part of a global cooperation network to share threat intelligence . Partnerships with universities and tech hubs can help: for example, academic researchers could collaborate with INEC on adversarial analysis, and with INTERPOL on tracking cross-border disinfo operators. A national bug-bounty program could reward citizen hackers for finding vulnerabilities in electoral software. On the software side, INEC’s communications teams should employ tools to watermark or cryptographically sign official videos and documents – making it easy for the public to verify authenticity. Over time, this AI-powered approach will make large-scale disinformation campaigns more visible and traceable.
• Engage Tech Platforms and Global Allies: Nigerian authorities and civil society must collaborate with global tech companies and multi-lateral bodies. As Meta’s recent efforts show, platforms can dedicate resources (e.g. native-language moderators, elections teams) to our context . The government should demand transparency: require social-media firms to report in real time on trending content and coordinated inauthentic activity around Nigerian elections. Civil society can also reach out to international watchdogs (IDEA, NDI, OSCE) for support with monitoring and training. On cybersecurity, Nigeria should align with initiatives like the AU’s Malabo Convention (on cybercrime and data protection) and the UN’s cyber norms. The country could host joint exercises (war games) on election hacking scenarios, as some democracies now do. By signing information-sharing agreements with friendly states, Nigeria can better trace foreign hacking groups. In short, treating election security as a global and intersectoral mission – rather than a purely domestic issue – will pool expertise and make attacks more costly for perpetrators.
• Empower INEC and Judiciary: Finally, integrity must be backed by enforcement. INEC has already pledged stronger voter education and communication strategies to combat misinfo . It should also invest in training its officials to recognize phishing and social-engineering. Security agencies (ICPC, EFCC) must be given clear mandates to pursue online election crimes. Specialized cybercrime courts or tribunals could deter hackers and foreign agents by promising swift prosecution. Civil society can pressure politicians to self-regulate: for example, through public scorecards on digital ethics or legal obligations to take down fraudulent content. The message must be clear: manipulating digital media for electoral gain will incur consequences. Only then can the moral high ground (as one analyst argued) be reclaimed – otherwise, “making people believe one untrue thing can make them believe that everything else is untrue as well” .
Conclusion: Defending Nigeria’s Democracy
Nigeria’s 2027 elections will not occur in a technological vacuum. The same AI and hacking tools that awoke global concern in 2016 and beyond are now turbocharged and widely available. The threats are real: from millions of cyber probes on INEC’s servers to the tantalizing promise of convincing deepfakes. But Nigeria is not powerless. By learning from international experience and past elections, and by proactively implementing the measures above, we can strengthen the resilience of our democracy. The time to prepare is now – before an election is decided not at the ballot box, but on someone’s laptop or phone. Nigeria cannot afford another election crisis in 2027, the country needs peace and security in order to achieve some of the development goals enshrined in some of the UN SDGs.
NB: Sonny Iroche is a 2022-2023 Senior Academic Fellow at the African Studies Centre. University of Oxford and a Post Graduate degree in Artificial Intelligence from the Saïd Business School. University of Oxford.
LinkedIn: http://linkedin.com/in/sonnyiroche
