By Johnson Babalola @jblawpro
1. Introduction: Admissibility Under IRPA
Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) establishes the framework for determining who may enter and remain in Canada. A central feature of this framework is the concept of admissibility — the legal standard by which immigration authorities assess whether a person can lawfully be granted entry, residence, or status.
Admissibility under IRPA is multifaceted and extends beyond simple background checks. It includes considerations such as:
* Security grounds (s. 34) — e.g., terrorism, subversion, espionage;
* Human or international rights violations (s. 35);
* Serious criminality and criminality (s. 36);
* Organized criminality (s. 37);
* Health grounds (s. 38);
* Financial reasons (s. 39);
* Misrepresentation (s. 40);
* Non-compliance with IRPA (s. 41); and
* Inadmissibility of family members (s. 42).
Each ground reflects Canada’s interest in protecting its security, public safety, economy, and social integrity. Some provisions are relatively straightforward, such as those dealing with financial insufficiency or medical inadmissibility, while others — particularly those dealing with security grounds — are more complex and often controversial.
Among these, section 34(1)(f) stands out for its breadth and preventive nature, as it renders individuals inadmissible merely for membership in certain organizations, even absent personal wrongdoing. It is this controversial provision that forms the focus of the discussion below.
2. The Statutory Framework
Under section 34(1)(f) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), a permanent resident or foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds if they are a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged, or will engage in acts such as espionage, subversion by force, subversion of democratic institutions, or terrorism.
Importantly, the organization in question does not need to be formally listed by Cabinet under section 83.05 of the Criminal Code (the official listing process for terrorist entities). IRPA establishes its own threshold, requiring only “reasonable grounds to believe” that the organization engages or will engage in the prohibited conduct. This makes the scope of s. 34(1)(f) broader and more flexible than the Criminal Code framework.
This clause serves a preventative function: liability arises purely from membership, regardless of personal participation or knowledge of the organization’s illicit actions.
3. Understanding “Subversion” and Judicial Interpretation
3.1. What Constitutes “Subversion”?
Although IRPA does not define “subversion,” Canadian courts have interpreted it broadly. In Oremade v. Canada (2005 FC 1077), the Federal Court held that “[s]ubversion by force” captures not only violent acts but also coercion or threats thereof, and even the “reasonably perceived potential for the use of coercion by violent means.”
In Najafi v. Canada (2014 FCA 262), the Federal Court of Appeal affirmed that subversion encompasses acts aimed at overthrowing any government. Motivation is irrelevant — it makes no difference whether the group claims to be resisting oppression or fighting for self-determination. See Onumonu v. MCI (2025 FC 1004) where the court rejected the argument of the applicant that IPOB is an organization fighting for the “human rights and self-determination of the Igbo people” and “should not be considered to be engaging in or instigating the subversive by force of the Nigerian government “.
3.2. Membership Liability Regardless of Awareness
IRPA’s framework demands a three-pronged test for inadmissibility under s. 34(1)(f):
a. Existence of an organization;
b. Reasonable grounds to believe the organization engages—or will engage—in subversion or terrorism;
c. The individual is a member, even without knowledge or involvement.
4. Further Judicial Developments
Alliances vs. Individual Groups: In Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Hemed (2024 FC 376), the Federal Court clarified that subversive acts by one group within an alliance cannot automatically taint all allied organizations or their members.
Actions That Maintain the Status Quo: Mejia Ramirez v. Canada (2024 FC 1939) extended the scope of subversion to include actions aimed at maintaining or manipulating a government’s power, even without overt violence. The applicants worked in the Columbian Department of Security.
Protecting Democracy: In Zahrebelnyi v. Canada (2025 FC 1338), Justice Battista confirmed that subversive conduct includes defending non-democratic regimes or resisting democratic change—reinforcing IRPA’s protective stance toward democratic institutions.
4. Implications for Applicants and Legal Practice
Zero-Tolerance for Membership: Even passive membership can trigger inadmissibility.
No Need for Cabinet Listing: Unlike Criminal Code terrorist listings, organizations need not be officially designated for s. 34(1)(f) to apply.
Context Matters: Evidence must show actual membership; affiliations do not automatically extend liability to all allies.
Non-Violent Acts Can Qualify: Actions preserving undemocratic status quo may still be treated as subversive.
Ministerial Exemption: The Minister may exempt individuals where admission is not contrary to national interest.
Case-by-Case Outcomes: Outcomes differ significantly depending on the individual’s circumstances, the organization’s activities, and available evidence. In Onumonu v. MCI 2025 FC 1004 and MPSEP v. Ubah (2025 FC 1241), the courts reached different conclusions based on the evidence presented whether the applicants were caught by the provisions of section 34(1)(f) of IRPA as members of IPOB. Every case will fall or stand on its own facts. In Egharevba v. MPSEP (2025 FC 1093), for instance, the applicant was found inadmissible because among others, he had testified that the PDP, a party he was a member of, had engaged in imposition of candidates, perpetrated political violence, operated under the “rules of the game” to stay in power at the time of his membership and that elections “were not free and fair” in Nigeria compared to Canada. Also see: Ukhueduan v. MCI 2023 FC 189; MPSEP v. Edom 2021 FC 1220; MCI v. U.S.A. 2014 FC 416 and Chukwudi v. MPSEP 2023 FC 423.
5. Defences and Avenues for Challenge
While the provision casts a wide net, applicants referred under s. 34(1)(f) have several avenues of defence:
5.1. Challenging Membership Evidence
The applicant can argue that they were not a true member of the organization but merely associated socially, or had nominal/forced involvement.
In the past, the courts had stressed that “membership” requires more than incidental contact; there must be some degree of commitment or association.
5.2. Disputing Organizational Characterization
Applicants may argue that the organization does not, in fact, engage in subversive activities.
Evidence from experts, NGOs, or international reports may be used to counter CBSA’s claims.
5.3. Temporal/Contextual Arguments
In Mahjoub v. Canada (2005 FC 156), courts recognized that past associations must be assessed in context, including time elapsed, coercion, or whether the organization has changed its character.
5.4. Ministerial Relief under s. 42.1 IRPA
Applicants can request ministerial relief on the grounds that their presence in Canada is not detrimental to national interest.
The courts have often acknowledged ministerial discretion as a vital safeguard in balancing security with fairness.
5.5. Procedural Fairness Arguments
Applicants may challenge the fairness of the process (e.g., inadequate disclosure of evidence).
Final Thoughts
Section 34(1)(f) IRPA is a powerful tool aimed at pre-emptively protecting Canada’s security and democratic institutions. Its scope is broader than the Criminal Code’s terrorist listing process because it applies without Cabinet designation and based on a lower threshold of “reasonable grounds to believe.”
Yet, its application is highly fact-specific. Courts have recognized that while IRPA casts a wide net, defences exist — particularly around evidence of membership, characterization of organizations, and ministerial relief. Each case must be assessed on its own facts, and outcomes may differ dramatically from person to person.
For applicants and counsel, the key is a strategic, evidence-based approach that challenges assumptions while invoking available statutory and constitutional safeguards.
N.B: Johnson Babalola, a Canada based immigration lawyer is a certified specialist in Canadian immigration and refugee law. @jblawpro www.jblawpro.com
Babalola, also a regular writer for The New Diplomat, an engaging Storyteller, and Workplace expert, wrote in from Toronto, Canada.
Disclaimer: Nothing in this article should be relied upon as legal advice.
